In 2014, West Africa confronted the most severe outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in history. At the onset of the outbreak-as now-there were no therapies approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for prevention of, post-exposure prophylaxis against, or treatment of EVD. As a result, the outbreak spurred interest in developing novel treatments, sparked calls to use experimental interventions in the field, and highlighted challenges to the standard approach to FDA approval of new drugs. Although the outbreak was geographically centered in West Africa, it showcased FDA's global role in drug development, approval, and access. FDA's response to EVD highlights the panoply of agency powers and demonstrates the flexibility of FDA's regulatory framework. This paper evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of FDA's response and makes policy recommendations regarding how FDA should respond to new and re-emerging public health threats. In particular, it argues that greater emphasis should be placed on drug development in interoutbreak periods and on assuring access to approved products. The current pandemic of Zika virus infection † Emily graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 2004. She continued her education at the University of Pennsylvania's School of Nursing, graduating summa cum laude in 2006, after which she worked as a cardiothoracic intensive care unit nurse. From 2008 to 2010, she was a fellow in the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. In 2016, she received the PhD degree in Health Policy, with a focus in ethics, from Harvard's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and the JD degree cum laude from Harvard Law School. Her current research interests include the ethics of human subjects research, particularly offers of payment made to research participants and the ethics of conducting research in public health emergencies.
an investigation by a small team of local health officials. 27 Although the investigation was inconclusive, the reported symptoms-including diarrhea, vomiting, and severe dehydration-'appeared similar to those of cholera, one of the area's many endemic infectious diseases'. 28 A second, larger investigation also supported the conclusion that the unknown disease was likely cholera. 29 An infected member of Emile's family carried the Ebola virus to the Guinean capital, Conakry, on February 1, 2014. 30 He died there, 4 days later, in a hospital. 31 No measures had been taken to protect either the hospital's staff or its other patients, as doctors had no reason to suspect the man was infected with Ebola. 32 As the month of February progressed, cases of EVD spread to additional prefectures-Macenta, Baladou, Nzerekore, and Farako-as well as to villages and cities en route to these destinations. 33 The Ministry of Health of Guinea issued its first alert to the unidentified disease on March 13, 2014. 34 A team sent by the Ministry of Health arrived in Guéckédou the next day. 35 On March 18, a team sent by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors without Borders, arrived.
36 Epidemiologic investigation began, and blood samples were collected and sent to laboratories in France and Germany for virologic analysis. 37 Ebola was identified on March 21. 38 The WHO issued its first communiqué on a new outbreak of EVD on March 23, 2014 . 39 In what has been called 'some of the worst luck in epidemiological history', 40 this Ebola outbreak-the 25th known outbreak of EVD 41 -occurred at the intersection of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, three of the world's poorest, least developed countries. An editorial in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine concluded that the vast scale of the outbreak was 'likely to be a result of the combination of dysfunctional health systems, international indifference, high population mobility, local customs, densely populated capitals, and lack of trust in authorities after years of armed conflict'. 42 The editorialists succinctly (and damningly) enumerated the barriers and shortcomings that made the West African Ebola outbreak difficult to control; however, those barriers and shortcomings deserve some further elaboration here. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id. Cholera is an acute diarrheal infection 'that can kill within hours if left untreated'. See generally WHO, Cholera Fact Sheet No. 107, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/ (last accessed July 29, 2016). 30 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. ('On that same day, staff at WHO's Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) formally opened an Emergency Management System event for a disease suspected to be Lassa fever'.). 35 Baize et al., supra note 8, at 1418, 1419. 36 Id. 37 Id. at 1419. 38 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. 39 
r EBOLA and FDA: reviewing the response to the 2014 outbreak
This is a region where doctors are 'rarer than paved roads'. 43 Liberia and Sierra Leone have some of the worst physician-patient ratios in West Africa. 44 The initially meager healthcare workforce was further diminished by the 'unprecedented' number of healthcare workers infected with the Ebola virus. 45 Nearly 700 healthcare workers were infected by the end of 2014, and more than half of these died. 46 When the outbreak began, hospitals and clinics lacked essentials like running water, soap, and personal protective equipment. 47 Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were already coping with major health challenges, including malaria and other endemic diseases. 48 Moreover, this was the first major outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, and 'the affected countries had weak capacity and structures for epidemic preparedness and response, particularly for viral hemorrhagic fever'. 49 Additionally, international health workers had largely pulled out of West Africa in the 1990s, when civil wars devastated Liberia and Sierra Leone. 50 As a result, it took more than three months to diagnose Ebola as the cause of the outbreak; a public health emergency was not declared until five months later, and it was nearly two more months before a humanitarian response was put into place.
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A homogenous community with shared sociocultural roots lives along the borders of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 52 and individuals move easily across the porous national borders. 53 The extensive cross-border movement of people facilitated the rapid spread of Ebola virus across West Africa. 54 Such movement also complicated tracking and follow-up of contacts. 55 Moreover, as the situation improved in one country, patients seeking unoccupied treatment beds were drawn from neighboring countries, a practice which reignited transmission chains. 56 Although roads were unpaved, villagers 43 Sack et al., supra note 22, at n.p. ('Liberia, for instance, had fewer than 250 physicians for 4 million people'). 44 del Rio et al., supra note 12, at 746 (explaining that there are 'more than 86 000 patients per physician in Liberia and 45 000 patients per physician in Sierra Leone'). 45 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. 46 (2015) . 47 Fauci, supra note 7, at 1085. 48 Id. 49 WHO, Ebola Virus Disease, West Africa-update, July 3, 2014, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014 07 03 ebola/en/ (last accessed August 31, 2016) see also del Rio et al., supra note 12, at 746 (explaining that the most useful tests for diagnosing Ebola have not been readily available in the remote areas of Africa where most outbreaks have occurred). 50 Sack et al., supra note 22, at n.p. 51 Farrar & Piot, supra note 41, at 1545, 1546. The NEW YORK TIMES Editorial Board called the WHO's handling of the Ebola outbreak 'anemic' and asserted that the agency's lapses have rightly been blamed on poor leadership in Geneva and in the WHO's regional office in Africa. The Board noted that the office in Africa was 'slow to respond, partly because it was staffed by politically appointed people of little competence and partly because it feared that declaring a widespread emergency would tarnish the regulation and international trade of afflicted countries'. The Editorial Board, Reform After the Ebola Debacle, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10, 2015. 52 WHO, supra note 49, at n.p. 53 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. 54 WHO, supra note 49, at n.p. 55 Id. 56 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. could ride motorcycles into densely populated cities. 57 In West Africa, cities became 'epicenters of intense virus transmission'. 58 The spread of EVD into cities further complicated contact tracing. 59 Additional challenges arose because distrust of government ran high due to decades of conflict. 60 Many West Africans had to be convinced that EVD was real 61 and reacted with indignation to outsiders demanding that they stop providing hands-on care to their sick relatives and friends. 62 Although governments sought to educate the public that Ebola was spread through contact with feces, vomit, and blood and that bodies remained highly contagious even after death, people continued to care for the living 63 and to wash the dead, a step which they 'considered essential to a dignified burial and a contended afterlife', in a manner that promoted spread of the virus. 64 These high-risk cultural practices led to extensive exposures to Ebola virus in the community, and facilitated the virus's transmission. 65 Reliance on traditional healers, lack of compliance with advice to seek early medical care, and stigma surrounding Ebola also disrupted control efforts. ('In a way, the use of motorcycles is a sign of how convoluted the struggle with Ebola has become. In early September, the [WHO] donated two dozen motorcycles to the Ministry of Health in Guinea, one of the countries hit hardest by the Ebola virus. A week later, WHO said motorbikes used as taxis were one of the ways Ebola was spreading in Liberia'.). 58 WHO, supra note 22, at n.p. 59 Fauci, supra note 7, at 1085. 60 Id. 61 The majority of Ebola 'cases and deaths were reported between August and December 2014, after which time case incidence began to decline as a result of the rapid scale-up of treatment, isolation, and safe burial capacity in' Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 75 In January 2016, WHO declared an end to the Ebola outbreak, the deadliest on record. 76 WHO's announcement 'mark[ed] the first time since the start of the epidemic ... that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone -the three countries that were hardest hit by the virus -had reported zero cases for at least 42 days, or two incubation periods of the virus'. 77 Although the outbreak has been 'stopped', 78 WHO continues to caution that future flare-ups of EVD are to be expected.
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C. The state of vaccines and treatments in 2014
At the time the West African Ebola outbreak began no vaccine or medication was proven effective in humans against Ebola. Even today, there are no 'FDA-approved 67 vaccines or therapeutics available for prevention, post-exposure, or treatment for EVD'. 80 Treatment consists of supportive care, providing oral rehydration and/or IV fluids with electrolytes, and treating complications. 81 Notably, the standard of care for treatment of hemorrhagic fevers, of which EVD is one, 'has not changed appreciably since the 1950s'. 82 
A neglected disease
Until 2014, fewer than 2400 cases of Ebola-of which more than 1500 were fatal-had been reported since 1976, when EVD was first identified. 83 The sheer rarity of Ebola and the unpredictability of outbreaks doubtlessly slowed the development of targeted vaccines and treatments. 84 The fact that Ebola is solely endemic to Africa has likely also played a role. It has been lamented, for example, that 'a vaccine would probably exist today if Ebola affected a large number of people in high-income countries, making research and development financially attractive to drug companies'. 85 Given that development of drugs and vaccines is both expensive and cumbersome, 86 and that the people who would most benefit from the development of Ebola therapies live in extreme poverty, it is difficult to attract investors. 87 Those affected by Ebola are widely seen as a vulnerable population whose health needs have not been met by the market economy. 88 While explanations for lags in drug development are typically in the wheelhouse of ethicists, economists, and health policy experts, the satirical news outlet The Onion published an article titled Experts: Ebola Vaccine At Least 50 White People Away. 89 The article states, '[W]aiting more than 50 white people for an effective prevention measure [is] something the world would simply not allow'. 90 The thrust of the article is that if white people, rather than black people, were the primary victims of the Ebola virus, there would already be a vaccine. Race was a lens through which some viewed and critiqued the outbreak and the subsequent response, though the factors were complex.
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Although EVD is not on WHO's list of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), 'a diverse group of [17] communicable diseases that prevail in tropical and sub-tropical conditions ... [and] mainly affect populations living in poverty', 92 comparisons have been drawn between EVD and the 'classic' NTDs. 93 Between 1975 and 2000, 'only 10% of global research and development resources were allocated for neglected diseases' 94 despite their pernicious impact on the 'bottom billion', those individuals living in the world's most impoverished conditions. 95 Almost everyone in the bottom billion has at least one NTD, and the NTDs serve to reinforce their poverty. 96 While the overall burden of disease due to EVD is dwarfed in comparison to the classic NTDs, when 'examined from a bottom billion viewpoint, there are multiple factors supporting the notion that [the] disease, and particularly outbreaks, are components of impoverished conditions'. 97 When existing or emerging viruses that cause diseases like EVD are neglected, that neglect exacerbates global health inequalities and directly implicates questions of distributive justice. 98 Thus, there is a moral and ethical dimension to the 2014 EVD outbreak-and to the lack of vaccines and therapies that, in part, allowed the virus to spread. Complicating this analysis, however, is the fact that, due to concerns over the potential use of Ebola as a biological weapon, 99 the US government and others have provided substantial funding for Ebola research. 100 Since 2003, for instance, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an agency within the U.S. Department of Defense that supports efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction, 101 'has invested more than $300 million to develop MCMs against hemorrhagic fever viruses' including Ebola. 102 In 2013, NIAID spent more than $42 million on Ebola research.
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In fact, some suggest that 'disproportionate resources' have been deployed for Ebola research and control as compared to other neglected diseases. 104 As a result of this investment, progress was made in understanding the Ebola virus and in developing potential therapies. 105 In addition to these investigational Ebola-specific vaccines and treatments, there was also interest in repurposing FDA-approved drugs-that is, drugs previously approved by the FDA for other indications-as treatments for EVD.
111 Repurposing is the process by which a drug that is patented and FDA-approved for treating one disease is further developed for the purpose of treating another disease.
112 Drugs could also be used 'off-label'. Off-label use is the prescribing of a drug or biological agent for a treatment regimen not specified in the FDA-approved labeling or package insert. 113 The legislative history of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic [(FD&C)] Act indicates that Congress did not intend FDA to interfere with the practice of medicine. Once a drug is approved for marketing, FDA does not generally regulate how, and for what uses, physicians prescribe that drug. A physician may prescribe a drug for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not listed in the FDA-approved labeling. 114 While concerns may arise when existing drugs are repurposed or prescribed off-label in a public health emergency, given the lack of alternatives, many felt repurposing and off-label prescribing were worth trying.
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II. CALLS FOR THE USE OF E XPERIMENTAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE
2014 OUTBRE AK As established above, at the onset of the 2014 EVD outbreak-the deadliest on record-the standard of care for hemorrhagic fevers, including EVD, had not progressed appreciably beyond supportive care since the 1950s. Due, however, to investments made by the U.S. Department of Defense and others, several candidate vaccines and treatments were in the works. Given the relative dearth of treatment options and a case fatality rate reported to be between 53% and 60%, 116 calls were made for the use of experimental interventions in the field. 117 In late August 2014, for instance, a panel convened by WHO concluded that an ethical imperative existed 'to offer the available experimental interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and in relevant animal models to patients and people at high risk of developing [Ebola]' as long as ethical criteria guided the provision of such interventions.
Section I above-poses practical and ethical challenges. 119 A challenge of particular relevance to FDA-and therefore a focus of this article-is that of gathering high-quality evidence to prove that a novel drug or vaccine is both safe and effective when used in humans. Before a vaccine or drug can be approved by FDA for marketing, it must be rigorously evaluated for quality, safety, and efficacy. 120 Given the history of investment by the U.S. Department of Defense in Ebola-related interventions, specifically those that were thought in 2014 to be most promising, and the likely role of the U.S. government as an eventual buyer of these interventions, calls to use experimental interventions in the field directly implicated FDA. Although Ebola is not endemic in the United States, if an intervention will be stockpiled and/or used by the American military, as Ebola drugs and vaccines likely would be, 'all critical functions in the development and acquisition ... lead to and through FDA'. 121 Additionally, although national regulatory authority (NRA) officials in any Ebola-affected country are ultimately responsible for determining whether an MCM for Ebola should be approved for use within the nation's borders, [ A. The research-care distinction Gathering evidence that a drug is safe and effective for use in humans requires the systematic conduct of human subjects research, research in which human beings ('as opposed to animals, atoms, or asteroids' 123 ) are the subjects of study. Clinical research, a type of human subjects research, explores new ways to prevent, detect, or treat illness in order to improve human health and well-being. 124 Clinical research has long been distinguished from clinical care. 125 Clinical care refers to interventions 'designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient ... and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose of medical ... practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment, or therapy to particular individuals'.
126 By contrast, research is 'designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge .... Research is usually described in a formal protocol that sets forth an objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective '. 127 Central to the distinction between research and care is the idea that the purpose of clinical research is fundamentally different from that of clinical medicine: whereas medical care focuses on providing optimal care to individual patients, clinical research is primarily concerned with producing knowledge for the benefit of future patients.
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Other characteristics of research include use of distinctive methods-such as randomization, placebo controls, and blinding-that sacrifice personalization of care in favor of scientific validity and the inclusion of procedures that hold no prospect of medical benefit for the research participant but which are justified in light of their scientific value. One consequence of the research-care distinction is that research ethics and medical ethics have long been considered distinct sets of normative commitments. 130 Clinical research and clinical care are also regulated differently. Human subjects research is governed by 'a series of international codes, national legislation, and agency regulations'.
131 FDA, for instance, requires 'adherence to the principles of good clinical practices (GCPs), including adequate human subject protection', 132 regardless of the funding source, in studies used to support an application to FDA for research or marketing permits for products regulated by FDA. The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines-also known as ICH GCP (E6)-is 'an international ethical and scientific quality standard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that involve the participation of human subjects'.
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FDA does not, by contrast, regulate the practice of medicine. Rather, long-standing congressional and FDA policies respect the regulatory role of states. 134 The FD&C Act explicitly states, '[N]othing ... shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate healthcare practitioner-patient relationship ' . 135 This has been interpreted to mean that
[i]f a physician determines that the use of a device is appropriate for their patient, as long as they're not studying the safety and effectiveness of that device, they may use the device under practice of medicine. Under practice of medicine, the physician should be well informed about the product, and use firm scientific rationale and sound medical evidence to determine whether they should use the device.
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While FDA advises physicians to use 'firm scientific rationale and sound medical evidence' 137 to guide their care, including off-label use, 'physicians failing to do so would not be answerable to FDA but rather to their state medical practice licensing boards and to plaintiffs in state medical malpractice suits'.
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The distinction between research and care is of fundamental importance because, once calls were made for the use of experimental interventions in the midst of the 2014 EVD epidemic, I will argue that the need for research was unavoidable. Because research and care are distinct, calls for use of experimental interventions also entailed adherence to distinct ethical and regulatory commitments that became a field for contestation.
B. The potential benefits of research to current patient-participants
Participation in research may or may not offer potential benefits to individual research participants. 139 Offering such benefits is not a criterion of ethically acceptable research. 140 In practice, institutional review boards (IRBs), the administrative bodies 'established to protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects recruited to participate in research activities', 141 are required to determine that the risks to individual participants have been minimized and that any residual risks are offset or outweighed by either the prospect of individual benefit or the social value of the knowledge to be gained. Thus, if the social value is sufficiently high (and all clinical research must have social value to be ethical), research may be IRB-approved even if it offers no potential benefit to research participants.
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A prevailing though contested ethical perspective on clinical trials does, however, hold that 'clinical equipoise' is necessary for research to be ethically acceptable.
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Clinical equipoise exists when the medical profession as a whole has not yet reached consensus that one arm of a clinical trial-whether the control or the experimental intervention-offers a therapeutic benefit over the other arm(s).
144 Accordingly, if there is genuine uncertainty that any of the arms is superior, it is ethical for the trial to proceed; individuals cannot, however, ethically be assigned to an arm that is, ex ante, known to be worse for them than the others. One implication of this position is that it rules out a placebo-controlled trial whenever a proven-effective treatment exists for a disorder. 145 Critically, 'ensuring that equipoise exists is not the same as establishing a reasonable chance of benefit'. 146 Significantly, clinical research can provide care for an individual that is good, or even optimal, depending on the alternatives available to the patient as well as on the design of the trial. 147 Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that some aspects of research participation may not be in an individual's best interest due to the loss of personalization and the inclusion of research-related procedures. For instance, a study protocol may include a research blood draw (eg to test the level of drug in an individual's 139 For a helpful taxonomy of benefits, see Nancy M.P. King bloodstream) that offers no potential for personal benefit (eg treatment wouldn't change on the basis of that blood level; it is simply for researchers to develop an idea of how quickly the drug is metabolized). While a research blood draw is relatively low risk, one could imagine progressively riskier procedures that offer no prospect of personal medical benefit but which are important for the scientific validity of a study. Such procedures, while justified, illustrate the potential tension between patients' individual interests and the aim of research to promote the greater good.
C. The benefits of research for future patients
Determining whether experimental interventions to prevent or treat EVD-or drugs repurposed or used off-label for EVD-are safe and effective for use in humans can only be accomplished by testing them in people exposed to or infected with the Ebola virus.
148 It would be unethical intentionally to expose healthy research participants to the highly lethal Ebola virus. Therefore, research conducted during outbreaks of EVD is likely to be the primary, if not sole, means of establishing the safety and efficacy of novel interventions. That is, it will be essential to systematically conduct human subjects research in the midst of an Ebola outbreak to secure the body of socially valuable generalizable knowledge needed to benefit those affected by future Ebola outbreaks.
There can, however, be discomfort with conducting clinical research-which, as discussed above, entails different normative commitments than clinical care-in a public health emergency laden with human suffering. Assuming that the status quo (ie treatment consisting of supportive care) is not acceptable, an alternative to robust research would be compassionate use, the use of an experimental intervention outside of a clinical trial. In the 2014 Ebola outbreak, some advocated for compassionate use. They maintained that compassionate use was more desirable than rigorous data collection because compassionate use offered 'hope for survival despite the fact that the efficacy and adverse effects of the [experimental] drug are unknown'.
149 Although compassionate use is theoretically compatible with learning about a drug's safety and efficacy, without well-designed research, it would be difficult to establish the evidence base needed to move the standard of care appreciably beyond where it currently stands. 150 Thus, a compassion-knowledge trade-off arises. The tradeoff can affect both the current patient-who receives a dose of hope from what is at bottom an unproven intervention-and future patients-who, going forward, will not benefit from a largely absent body of generalizable knowledge. The tradeoff can also adversely affect third parties if compassionate use consumes scarce healthcare resources for uncertain clinical benefits.
151 Emphasis needs to be placed on research to validate the safety and efficacy of experimental interventions because outcomes for patients collectively are optimized when the practice of medicine is based on current knowledge.
Of course, there is understandable reluctance to deny anyone presenting with a lifethreatening condition like EVD access to a potentially beneficial intervention, to hope. This reluctance is, however, a misguided moral impulse and should not guide policy. The dilemma posed by compassionate use can be analogized to difficulties related to how scarce resources should be allocated between identified and statistical lives. The preference for identifiable lives-individuals currently known to us-over statistical lives-individuals who are as yet unknown or possibly not yet in existence-has been criticized as mistaken by many bioethicists. 152 One argument made in favor of saving identifiable lives, the 'symbolic value argument', is that by rescuing identifiable lives, a society demonstrates the value it places on human life, thereby promoting social utility. 153 Yet, '[i]t is unclear why showing respect for identified lives better captures this symbolic value of life; indeed, one might think it is statistical lives that captures the notion that all lives are equal and of the same value'. 154 The implication of this argument is not that identifiable lives do not matter. The implication is that they do not deserve any 'preference over the equivalent number of statistical lives'. 155 Gains for future patients should not be sacrificed in order to offer a benefit as ephemeral as hope to current patients-particularly when hope is conditioned on receipt of an admittedly unproven intervention. In such circumstances, clinical research rather than compassionate use is the appropriate response.
Rigorous research was ethically appropriate-whether or not one recognizes a role within research ethics for clinical equipoise-because the 2014 Ebola outbreak was characterized by genuine uncertainty. Moreover, research was necessary because the outbreak was likely the sole opportunity, at least until the next outbreak, ethically to conduct research and, hopefully as a result, to have FDA approved treatments available in future Ebola epidemics. Even if one accepted, however, that it was both ethically acceptable and imperative to conduct research in the midst of an EVD epidemic, open questions remained about what kind of research should be conducted-that is, how the research should be designed and executed. That is the focus of the next subsection.
D. An argument for randomized placebo-controlled trials
Studies conducted in the midst of a public health emergency 'raise difficult ethical, scientific, and practical questions about how best to design and conduct research'. 156 One such question is whether it is ethically acceptable to conduct a randomized placebocontrolled trial. 157 This question was highly divisive in the 2014 Ebola outbreak. efficiently identifying safe and effective interventions for EVD, others argued for providing access to potentially beneficial experimental interventions as widely as possible and, therefore, advocated for use of alternative trial designs that did not incorporate randomization to placebo controls. The debate surrounding randomized placebo-controlled trials had two primary strains. On the one hand, there were questions about whether alternative trial designs were sufficiently methodologically rigorous to yield valid results; on the other, there were questions about whether it was ethical in the context of the 2014 EVD outbreak to randomize individuals to a control arm and deny them the opportunity to benefit from an experimental intervention. I consider each of these in turn and argue that those in favor of randomized placebo-controlled trials held the superior position; here, I bracket off discussion of prevention trials, as treatment and prevention can raise quite different issues.
Validity of results
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard means of assessing whether a potential treatment is efficacious. In the preapproval stage at FDA, 'RCTs are regarded as fulfilling the statutory requirement of "adequate and well-controlled" studies to support a marketing claim'. 159 Randomization ensures that individuals who receive the experimental intervention do not systematically differ from the control group along observable or unobservable dimensions. 160 This allows valid (ie causal) inferences to be drawn about the safety and efficacy of the novel intervention. 161 A central fear of those opposed to alternative trial designs was that such designs might lack validity and yield biased conclusions. While conceding that '[u]ncontrolled trials can give accurate answers when certain stringent conditions are met, including preliminary evidence of large effect sizes and the availability of data from historical cohorts that permit valid comparisons', 162 they argued that those opposing RCTs had failed to demonstrate those conditions could be met in the West African epidemic. Although such data can provide important information about drug utilization and safety once a medication is in use, there is considerable evidence that these approaches are not as rigorous or valid as randomized trials in assessing efficacy.) 160 Joffe, supra note 150, at 1300. 161 Id. 162 Id. (internal citations omitted). 163 Id.
It is ethically concerning if research participants are exposed to research-related risks and burdens that cannot be justified because a study is not scientifically valid. 164 Moreover, a real concern was that misleading results from an uncontrolled study could have negative ramifications for many stakeholders in a high-stakes situation.
Mistakenly determining a benefit or missing a potential harm can directly hurt research participants as well as individuals who use the intervention if implemented, and can impose substantial economic costs on communities and societies [by misdirecting scarce healthcare resources]. In contrast, failing to detect a modest but meaningful level of clinical effectiveness might deprive those in need of an intervention that can reduce suffering or improve chances of survival. 165 Proponents of RCTs argued that a randomized placebo-controlled trial would increase confidence in the accuracy of research findings.
As mentioned above, there is understandable reluctance to deny anyone with a lifethreatening condition access to a promising experimental intervention, for example, by screening them out of a clinical trial via inclusion and exclusion criteria or by randomizing them to a placebo-control arm. However, if only RCTs can provide reliable information about safety and efficacy, then alternative trial designs unacceptably favor current patients at the expense of future patients-a position which is not ethically tenable. A moral impulse to offer a potential benefit to current patients cannot overcome concerns about the validity of research results.
A practical concern that informed the debate about validity of results was that, as mentioned above, only small amounts of experimental interventions had been manufactured at the time of the 2014 outbreak. This meant that few courses were available for use in research. This point was made by those opposed to RCTs. Of course, if insufficient amounts were available to allow for the conduct of scientifically valid studies, then RCTs should not be performed. 166 To do so would unacceptably expose research participants to research-related risks that could not be justified. 167 Yet, the possibility of misleading results due to too small sample sizes is also an argument against conducting non-randomized or uncontrolled studies because the requirements of social value and scientific validity are universal.
168 Therefore, the argument from small quantities risked proving too much.
Even accepting that it is possible for alternative trial designs to yield valid results that constitute a sufficiently robust basis for both clinical practice and health policy, it is necessary to concede that in any particular circumstances, as a threshold matter, methodologists must determine that alternative trial designs are appropriate. In the 2014 outbreak, the position in favor of alternative designs did not secure sufficient consensus among methodologists to justify moving away from the gold standard of RCTs. Therefore, it was essential to answer the outstanding normative question: whether research participants can ethically be randomized to a placebo control. 
Randomization to a control arm
A primary objection made to the conduct of RCTs in the 2014 outbreak was that it was unethical to randomize individuals to a control arm-that is, not to give them access to a promising experimental intervention-given the high case fatality rate of Ebola. 169 For example, a prominent editorial in the Lancet asserted, 'When conventional care means such a high probability of death, it is problematic to insist on randomising patients to [conventional (i.e., supportive) care] when the intervention arm holds out at least the possibility of benefit'. 170 I will argue, however, that proponents of this position are mistaken. Use of controls, including placebo controls, would be ethical.
First, as the editorial acknowledged, in an RCT evaluating an experimental intervention for EVD, research participants would likely be randomized to receive either (i) the experimental intervention in conjunction with the necessary supportive care or (ii) supportive care only or, possibly, supportive care plus a placebo. 171 It is essential to underscore that in such trials, receiving a placebo or being assigned to the control arm is not equivalent to no care. Supportive care was not available to many people in West Africa during the 2014 outbreak.
172 Therefore, being enrolled in a study that provided supportive care could, in and of itself, be an improvement over an individual's status quo at baseline. While this fact is regrettable, it also weakens the argument made against controls.
Second, a mere 10% of drugs that are developed make it to clinical trials, and of those, just one in five is ultimately made available to the public. 173 While there may be several explanations for this, one is that clinical research may reveal that a drug is not safe, not effective, or neither safe nor effective. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume-as some opponents of controls implicitly seem to do-that individuals are necessarily disadvantaged when they do not receive an experimental intervention. They seemingly overestimate the possibility of benefit. Although there was promising evidence from animal models-for instance, ZMapp was 100% effective in studies with rhesus macaques 174 but had not finished typical animal safety testing 175 -there must be caution when inferring the implications for humans from animal data. There is no guaranteed benefit. Moreover, the risks are uncertain. There is a possibility that experimental interventions can make people not just no better off but materially worse off, which also appears to be underplayed by those who reject controls. It may be argued in response that when a condition has as high a case fatality rate as EVD, surely, the risks associated with taking an experimental drug cannot be any worse than the risks of having EVD and receiving the standard of care and may, in fact, be better. I concede that reasonable people may-and likely would-prefer to try an apparently promising experimental intervention under such circumstances. Yet, the reported case fatality rate in the 2014 outbreak hovered around 50%, and it is arbitrary line drawing to say that this is the point where it is ethically superior to provide access to an experimental intervention despite the genuine uncertainty about the attendant risks and benefits.
Fourth, individuals do not have a right to access experimental interventions outside of clinical research, 176 nor do they have a right to those interventions conditional on participating in clinical research. 177 Investigators do not have a therapeutic obligation to research participants. 178 Recall, the purpose of research is to produce generalizable knowledge for the benefit of future patients.
[T]he point of medical trials is not to provide the intervention that's medically best for the research subject. It's to establish something that's important-and this point is crucialfor a far larger population and to prevent human catastrophe.
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Just as clinical research may justifiably require exposing research participants to procedures that hold no prospect of medical benefit for them personally, research may require randomizing some individuals to a control group. The burdens and risks randomization imposes on individuals are justified by their social and scientific value. To claim that individuals have a right to a promising experimental intervention is to confuse the ethics of research and care.
An argument can be made that Ebola-ravaged populations have a right to healthcare. 180 It is indisputably unfortunate that existing healthcare systems in countries like Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone cannot meet the pressing need for even the most basic healthcare. It is not, however, the obligation of researchers to fulfill this right. to provide post-trial access to beneficial interventions. 183 It would be wrong, however, to claim that researchers exploit research participants when clinical research offers fair benefits-even if potential research participants' background situation is an unfair one and even if that background situation leads them to feel they have no alternative but to participate in research. 184 The desire to provide clinical benefit to everyone affected by EVD should be realized by strengthening health systems, not by prohibiting controls. 185 Research and strengthening of healthcare systems must be pursued simultaneously.
Finally, when a resource-like an EVD treatment-is scarce, clinicians and policymakers face the difficult task of determining how to allocate it among the many individuals who might benefit. Inevitably, rationing will be necessary, and by definition, not everyone who might benefit will be able to have access. It follows from this that there is a real possibility promising experimental interventions might be allocated unfairly. Randomization offers a means to allocate a scare resource fairly.
186 This is preferable to alternate rationing approaches that seem facially to be fair but have disparate impacts on lesser-resourced groups in practice.
To choose but one example, well-off and well-connected patients should not be further privileged in a public health emergency by being prioritized to receive a promising albeit unproven intervention. 187 This would be unfair and could undermine the perceived legitimacy of the public health response to the outbreak. This is not idle speculation. For example, initially, there was only enough ZMapp for seven patients. 188 Many were critical of the fact that two white Americans aid workers, Nancy Writebol and Dr. Kent Brantley, received ZMapp when comparably sick Africans did not. 189 It was reported that Brantly and Writebol's employer, Samaritan's Purse, only requested two doses of ZMapp, despite the fact that they were treating about 17 other Ebola patients in their Liberian clinic. 190 Although, Mapp Biopharmaceutical Inc., the company that makes ZMapp, says that it filled requests for ZMapp on a first-come, first-served 183 First-come, first-served-the allocation method favored by many advocates of alternative trial design-may superficially seem like a fair way of distributing a scarce resource, but on further reflection, it is abundantly clear that such an allocation scheme inherently favors the privileged-for example, those who know where to go and have the means to get there-while ignoring other relevant considerations.
193 Randomization within an ethically conducted RCT offers an alternative way to allocate the scarce resource-a drug with the potential (not the promise) to offer an advantage over standard care-fairly among individuals who meet a study's eligibility criteria and who agree to contribute to the social good achieved by answering the crucial question: is this intervention beneficial, neutral, or harmful?
WHO has cautioned that flare-ups of EVD are to be expected in the wake of the 2014 outbreak, 194 and experts expect that there will be other EVD outbreaks in the future.
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Additionally, we can assume that public health emergencies will arise from other threats like Zika virus. It is, therefore, essential to balance individual patient needs and preferences with broader public health considerations. For the reasons outlined above, it is both ethical and necessary to conduct research, including randomized placebocontrolled trials as the opportunity arises, to develop and identify safe and effective drugs and vaccines for use in future outbreaks. From a research ethics perspective, conducting randomized placebo-controlled trials in the midst of a public health emergency can be justified. Now, let us turn to the formal laws that govern the situation to see how they can advance the goals of drug development, approval, and access in a public health emergency.
III. DEVELOPMENT, APPROVAL, AND ACCESS
A primary reason for FDA involvement in the West African Ebola outbreak was that any drug, device, or biologic must be reviewed by FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and deemed safe and effective before it is marketed in the United States. In this section, I will briefly review the standard process for drug and vaccine development, approval, and marketing/access-the process by which experimental interventions progress from the lab into the hands of consumers-and highlight challenges that arose in 2014-2015.
A. The standard model
The standard model has three phases: drug development, drug approval, and finally, drug access. 191 Skwarecki, supra note 190, at n.p. 192 Pollack, supra note 175, at n.p. (but also quoting an African researcher as saying 'It would have been the frontpage screaming headline: Africans used as guinea pigs for American drug company's medicine' if ZMapp had been tested in Africans first). 193 1. Development The costs of developing a new drug are often estimated to exceed $1 billion, 196 and it takes an average of 10 years to complete the journey from bench to bedside. 197 This expensive and lengthy process begins with the identification of potential biological targets, or structures in the body that will react with a drug compound to produce the desired clinical effect, 198 such as treating EVD. Typically, after starting with thousands of candidate drug compounds, the field is narrowed to one or more 'lead compounds', 'promising molecule[s] that could influence the target and, potentially, become a medicine'. 199 Pre-clinical testing is used to identify those lead compounds that will advance to clinical trials. 200 Clinical research is part of the drug development process, 201 as FDA does not test the safety or efficacy of drugs itself but instead relies on data supplied by the pharmaceutical company seeking to market the drug. 202 If a company wishes to test a drug, device, or biologic it has developed within the United States, it is first required to contact FDA in order to obtain an Investigational New Drug (IND) application. 203 An IND details the results of preclinical work, including a list of potential side effects indicated by preclinical studies, and provides a detailed clinical trial plan, outlining how, where, and by whom clinical studies will be conducted. 204 While the full safety profile of a novel drug is obviously not known when the company seeks an IND, the company must provide data gathered in laboratory and animal testing to support the claim that the drug is safe enough to give to humans. 205 FDA's 'primary concern [w]hen reviewing an original IND submission or planning for a pre-IND meeting ... is the safety of the subjects who will receive the drug during the proposed clinical trial'. 206 As discussed above, CDER requires companies to adhere with GCPs.
An IND becomes effective 30 days after the application is submitted, unless FDA imposes a clinical hold. 207 Only after the company has an IND in hand can it begin a multi-phase clinical trial to establish safety (phase I), to establish efficacy (phase 2), and to compare the new treatment to the current standard of care in a larger study population (phase 3). 208 Clinical trials take, on average, 6 to 7 years to complete. 209 Clinical trials that take place outside the United States-as Ebola trials likely woulddo not, by contrast, require an IND, although a sponsor may choose to conduct a foreign clinical study under an IND. 210 Companies can, therefore, avoid any kind of preliminary review regarding the adequacy of human subjects protections. 211 However, should a company subsequently seek to market a drug in the United States, 'FDA has the legal authority to require sponsors to certify that the data they are using was obtained under the same human subjects protections as would be applicable in the United States'. 212 The GCP requirements help to ensure that non-IND foreign studies are conducted in a manner comparable to that required for IND studies.
Approval
Once clinical trials have been completed, companies then submit a new drug application (NDA) to FDA. A team from CDER-consisting of physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists-will review the NDA, which contains data from the clinical trials as well as the proposed labeling 213 and which can run 100 000 pages or more. 214 The 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act established two tiers of review: standard and priority. 215 Drugs that offer major advances in treatment or provide a treatment where none previously existed-as would be the case for therapies targeted at Ebola-are designated for priority review. The goal for completing a priority review is 6 months. The target for standard review is 10 months.
Access
If the NDA is approved, the product may be marketed in the United States. The delay between the NDA and the grant of marketing authorization has been identified as a preliminary barrier to patient access to new drugs. 216 Yet, access to FDA-approved drugs will depend, in the United States-as elsewhere-on formulary placement, cost-sharing, and conditions of reimbursement. 217 Coverage may not be evenly spread over the population.
B. Challenges to the standard model in the 2014 outbreak
The standard model, just outlined, has significant limitations in public health emergencies like the West African EVD outbreak. As just described, developing a new drug and getting FDA approval is time consuming. Companies may spend years-or even decades-developing a drug and ushering it through clinical trials before they send an NDA to FDA for review, which then takes 6 months or more. While this is true of all drugs, there are two key implications in a public health emergency.
First, it is exceedingly unlikely that an entirely new treatment will or even can be developed from scratch during an epidemic. Rather, promising compounds must already be far along the development pipeline if they are to have an impact in the near term. EVD might be relatively unique among public health threats in that there had already been significant investment in basic research and drug development before the 2014 outbreak in light of concerns the Ebola virus might be used in bioterrorism. Promising compounds are unlikely to be at the ready if a public health emergency is the result of a NTD or comparable illness that is not commercially attractive to pharmaceutical companies or if it is the result of an emerging threat with which clinicians and researchers have yet to become familiar. Second, even if a drug has already been developed, including the completion of clinical trials, if it is not yet FDA approved, it is unlikely that FDA will be able to approve it in time to meet the most pressing patient demands in an outbreak. Taken together, these two considerations suggest that it is extremely important to prioritize drug development and approval of drugs addressing public health threats in interoutbreak periods to the greatest extent possible, granting that the 'greatest extent possible' might be quite limited.
Further challenges to drug development, approval, and access arose in the 2014 outbreak and are likely to recur in future public health emergencies. First, as mentioned in Section II, it was necessary to conduct clinical trials in the midst of the outbreak because it is unethical intentionally to expose healthy research participants to the Ebola virus. Yet, conducting research in the midst of an outbreak raised contentious ethical and methodological questions, and people had widely divergent views on how best to proceed. Furthermore, conditions on the ground, discussed in Section I, made both the delivery of care and the conduct of research extremely difficult from a practical perspective. 218 Although the particular challenges that will be confronted on the ground in any given public health emergency cannot be anticipated in advance, there are ethical, methodological, and practical considerations that can and should be anticipated and addressed as part of pre-planning for clinical trials that will transpire in such circumstances.
Second, there were few doses of experimental interventions available for conducting clinical trials, and as the outbreak receded and the number of EVD cases waned, the epidemiological trajectory made it increasingly difficult to conduct RCTs, to show efficacy. 219 Even if an experimental intervention had successfully passed through clinical trials, however, FDA and other regulatory agencies were likely to confront relatively limited data on safety and efficacy in light of the small size of the patient population. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether alternative approval pathways are appropriate, how data collection standards might be compromised in an epidemic to achieve the appropriate balance between speeding approval and protecting drug consumers, and what, if any, post-marketing trials should be required.
Finally, the prospect of FDA approval raises important questions about who should have access to FDA-approved therapies in a public health emergency and how this will be accomplished. MSF, for example, worried that there was no mechanism to ensure that West African patients would have access to EVD treatments. An FDA-approved drug is of little value if it does not get into the hands of those who need it because, for example, they cannot afford it or because it cannot be manufactured in sufficient quantities. Although there are independent normative arguments for why global health inequalities should be addressed, in a public health emergency-particularly in an age when global air transit brings us together and exposes us more widely to health risksthere are additional self-interested reasons to ensure broad access.
In order for FDA's response to any public health emergency to be maximally effective, the agency must anticipate and address barriers to development, approval, and access. Here, I have made preliminary, broad recommendations for how this might be accomplished. In the next section, I will look at how FDA in fact used its flexible regulatory framework to respond to these challenges in the 2014 outbreak and make more granular recommendations for how FDA might better respond to future public health emergencies.
IV. FDA AND THE 2014 OUTBRE AK
During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, FDA worked to 'help expedite the development and availability of medical products-such as treatments, vaccines, diagnostic tests, and personal protective equipment-with the potential to help bring the Ebola epidemic in West Africa under control as quickly as possible'. 220 FDA's response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak showcases the agency's panoply of powers and its regulatory flexibility, which enabled it to move relatively rapidly in the context of a public health emergency. Yet, if one considers the response along the dimensions of development, approval, and access, it is clear that there is room for substantial improvement in the response to future public health emergencies.
Unfortunately, more public health emergencies are inevitable. Threats may come from reemerging or from new diseases. The recent pandemic of Zika virus infection in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean is but one example. 221 On The response to the 2014 EVD outbreak therefore serves as a useful case study from a health policy perspective because it allows us to understand FDA's response to a particular public health emergency and to draw lessons for moving forward. I focus on describing and evaluating six steps taken and one not taken by FDA. Some of my suggestions would simply require FDA to assume a broader role in coordination and planning in interemergency periods; others, however, would require congressional action to alter or expand the scope of FDA's powers. While one could imagine a range of policy interventions by a broad array of actors-both domestic and international-that would yield improvements along the dimensions of development, approval, and access, this section focuses more narrowly on what FDA in particular is able to do and how FDA's capacity to respond could be further strengthened.
A. Offering development incentives
During the 2014 outbreak, FDA actively used drug development programs to encourage the pursuit of Ebola vaccines and treatments. 227 As discussed in Section I above, many, 'including the [Director-General of WHO Dr.] Margaret Chan, have criticized the pharmaceutical industry's lack of investment in investigational treatments for [EVD], saying many companies had likely determined the return on any investment for an Ebola treatment was not worth the development cost'. 228 Development incentives are intended to overcome entrenched reluctance to invest in neglected diseases. Unfortunately, the two development incentives at FDA's disposal-the Orphan Drug Act and vouchers for priority review-had clear shortcomings when used in the context of EVD.
Orphan Drug Act
The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 was passed to counterbalance market forces and incentivize development of drugs defined by statute as affecting fewer than 200 000 people in 222 Id. 223 the United States. 229 The act offers pharmaceutical companies a variety of incentives, including market exclusivity, tax credits, and research grants. 230 These are 'push' and 'pull' incentives for drug development. Whereas 'push' is focused on the cost side of the profit equation, 'pull' is focused on the revenue side: 'push' incentives serve to lower the logistical and financial barriers to entry, while 'pull' incentives increase the likelihood that there will be a sufficient return on investment once products reach market. 231 In 2014, FDA granted orphan designation to products being developed to treat EVD, including ZMapp. 232 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has previously concluded that the Orphan Drug Act 'unquestionably stimulated the development [of drugs] for rare diseases', 233 particularly for rare genetic diseases affecting Americans. 234 This success is partially attributable to the surprising profitability of orphan drugs. Eighteen blockbuster drugs-those with global annual sales of greater than $1 billion-were approved solely as orphan drugs within the United States. 235 The profitability of orphan drugs has been 'driven [in part] by a strong disposition among healthcare purchasers in high-income countries to pay for these drugs at high prices'. 236 These drugs can be prohibitively costly for patients without means. The effect of the Orphan Drug Act on the development of drugs for NTDs and other neglected public health threats has been markedly less impressive. Some have concluded that the act's generous subsidies 'are not enough when prospective gains from commercialization are poor'. 237 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which created the priority review voucher (PRV) program, discussed below, was passed to address this deficit and create a greater 'pull' specifically for NTDs. 238 With respect to the Orphan Drug Act, the pharmaceutical industry has consistently identified the 7-year marketing exclusivity provision as the act's most important 'pull' lever. 239 This fact led some to advocate during the 2014 EVD outbreak for extending the marketing exclusivity period from 7 to 10 years to further strengthen incentives for development of Ebola drugs. 240 Extending the marketing exclusivity period, which would require an act of Congress, would, in theory, create some additional 'pull'. Yet, it is unclear that this amendment to the Orphan Drug Act would make any meaningful difference with respect to current or future public health threats because, '[f]or things like Ebola, there is no clear buyer other than the government'. 241 Beyond the government, the market for EVD treatments was both small and likely unable to pay for any saleable product. Under the circumstances, it would be more effective for Congress to introduce advanced market commitments (AMCs). AMCs have not been used for NTDs, 242 but they could incentivize development by setting a minimum price and quantity for purchase, for example, conditioned on receipt of orphan drug designation and FDA approval.
In the case of NTDs and other public health threats, it is doubtful that orphan drug designation currently offers sufficient 'push' incentives for the development of interventions to address public health threats either. Additional 'push' solutions need to be identified. While FDA could potentially administer these, for example, by deepening the tax credits and research grants tied to orphan drug designation, it would be preferable to look beyond FDA and increase federal research funds to support development of vaccines and treatments for public health threats-for instance, to look to NIH and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA).
243 Given its first-hand knowledge of the shortcomings of orphan designation, FDA should advocate for these changes as a complement to its own efforts.
PRV program
On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed the Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act into law. 244 This was an amendment to the FDAAA, which was intended to provide incentives to companies to invest in NTDs. The FDAAA added new section 524 to the FD&C Act, which authorizes FDA to award PRVs to, sponsors of certain tropical disease product applications that meet the criteria specified by the Act'. An ex post reward for developers, the PRV is a transferable voucher for future priority review on a subsequent drug or biologic brought before FDA. The PRV program seeks to 'incentivize the development of tropical disease products without burdening taxpayers or delaying generic entry'. 246 Compared to the Orphan Drug Act, which significantly subsidizes the inputs of innovation ('push'), the [PRV] program rewards only the successful outputs of the pharmaceutical R&D process. The vouchers, therefore, serve exclusively as a pull mechanism to stimulate the development of drugs that might not otherwise be brought to market due to insufficient sales potential.
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PRVs provide a significant advantage to drug manufacturers, as they entitle their holder to a 6-month priority review by FDA, rather than the standard 10-month review. 248 It has been estimated that a PRV 'would be worth more than $300 million for a potential blockbuster drug' because the drug reaps the benefit of entering the market significantly earlier. 249 Alternatively, a PRV may be transferred or sold to another sponsor, 250 which can also be lucrative. For instance, Sanofi paid $245 million for a PRV in 2015. 252 Ebola serves as a potent reminder that the PRV program is too narrow as currently written to address burgeoning public health threats, which may not be 'classic' NTDs, the characteristics of which were addressed at some length in Section I. It has been suggested that the PRV program should be expanded to include biodefense products, 253 a category that would include Ebola, and could also be relevant to some future public health emergencies. While potentially beneficial, such an eligibility expansion is an incomplete solution at best.
The delayed expansion of the PRV program to include Ebola could be characterized as needlessly hampering FDA's ability to incentivize EVD research. Incentivizing research with PRVs only after the outbreak began was unlikely to make any meaningful difference in the short term-that is, the lifecycle of the 2014 outbreak. The failure to 246 include EVD in the original FDAAA was faulted for stalling 'auspicious early research' into EVD drugs and vaccine candidates due to a lack of interest from the private sector. 254 Yet, given the low overall number of people affected by EVD before the 2014 outbreak began, this is probably overstating the effect that more timely PRVs would have had. A PRV would effectively have been the lone commercial reward for any Ebolaspecific product developed because there was, in reality, no market for such products. The approximately $300 million value of the PRV would likely have been insufficient on its own for pharmaceutical companies, given that the costs of developing a new drug or vaccine are often estimated to exceed $1 billion.
More broadly, PRVs have been criticized as 'an inefficient and potentially dangerous way of encouraging research into [neglected] tropical diseases'. 255 For large pharmaceutical companies, PRVs do not 'directly connect the incentive with the innovation ... [because] the voucher's value depends on the success of potential 'blockbuster' drugs that are currently in their pipelines, which is far from assured'.
256 Small companies, which conduct the majority of tropical disease research, will often be unable to use their vouchers themselves, 257 though it can, as just mentioned, be lucrative to sell them. A further challenge of 'pull' funding instruments like PRVs is that they assume that a drug or vaccine developer has the funds available up-front to invest in initial R&D and clinical development. 258 Yet, that will not always be the case, particularly given the role for small companies, just mentioned. 'Push' mechanisms-like funding of clinical trials-will also be needed to provide an urgently needed infusion of funds. 259 Thus, the PRV program should be understood not a stand-alone solution to the problem of NTDs but as a complement to other mechanisms for encouraging drug development.
Even if we assume, however, that (i) the lure of PRVs is sufficient to drive the development of new drugs for NTDs, EVD, or other public health threats that might be added to the PRV program and (ii) companies have or can obtain the necessary upfront funds, this can be viewed as only a first step in providing a drug to combat a public health threat. The mere existence of a drug or drugs does not ensure that those who need them will have access. In order to receive a PRV, a company must only get FDA approval for its new drug. The company is not required to facilitate access to the drug for those who need it. 260 In practice, sustainable access to drugs that have earned their developers PRVs has not been achieved in developing countries. 261 Experience prompted MSF to describe the addition of EVD to the PRV program as 'much-welcome' but simultaneously to express concern that there was still no 'way to ensure that patients, 254 Arnold & Pogge, supra note 247, at 229 FDA has already-and for unrelated reasons-asked for changes to the PRV program. 263 It should request further changes in the program to enhance the response to future public health emergencies. In particular, Congress should make explicit demands that companies seeking a PRV demonstrate that reasonable efforts have been made to facilitate access to any new drug. 264 This could be accomplished by having the developer manufacture and market the drug itself at an affordable price or by licensing the drug to another manufacturer to achieve the same result. 265 Such changes to the legislation would further align the economic incentives of drug developers with broader public health needs.
B. Granting fast track status
Fast Track is 'a process designed to facilitate the development, and expedite the review of drugs to treat serious conditions and fill an unmet medical need'. 266 Fast Track programs have previously been used to address bioterror threats, pandemic threats, and neglected diseases. 267 FDA granted Fast Track status to several Ebola treatments, including TKM-Ebola in 2014 268 and ZMapp in 2015.
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A drug company must request Fast Track designation. FDA reviews the request and makes a decision within 60 days. A drug that receives Fast Track designation is eligible for more frequent meetings with FDA to discuss the drug's development plan; more frequent communication from FDA; accelerated approval and priority review, if certain criteria are met; and rolling review. 270 By opening the lines of communication between the drug company and FDA, Fast Track designation 'assures that questions and issues are resolved quickly, often leading to earlier drug approval and access by patients'. 271 Although development times are comparable to other newly approved drugs and biologics, Fast Track-designated products have shorter median approval times. 272 Due to the challenges associated with developing a drug or vaccine to address a public health emergency, the need for frequent consultation with FDA is likely. Formalizing this process-that is, getting Fast Track designation-can be an 'important milestone' for a company. 273 This is not merely a formality. While orphan designation, just addressed, fosters innovation directly, Fast Track designation 'arguably does so indirectly'. 274 An econometric analysis of Fast Track suggests that shortening the arduous path from lab bench to pharmacy shelf can have the following effects: (i) earlier access to cash returns; (ii) cuts in development costs; (iii) allowing a sponsor to gain first mover advantage, ie engender brand loyalty resulting in higher and longer market share; and (iv) earlier launch, and thus longer effective patent life or period of market exclusivity protection. 275 Unsurprisingly, Fast Track status is often pursued in conjunction with other development incentives, like orphan drug designation and PRVs. 276 The Fast Track process is beneficial to speeding FDA approval, which is a necessary though not sufficient condition for access, and will work best when public health goals are clear. Obviously, such clarity may be difficult to achieve when emerging threats are broadly anticipated but the particulars are unknown. Nevertheless, looking forward, it is important that FDA clearly communicate with drug developers during inter-epidemic periods and suggest they apply for Fast Track designation in order to direct efforts towards advanced planning for accelerating the development and testing of promising interventions when epidemic situations arise. 277 During the 2014 outbreak it was said that several vaccines and drugs ... have shown promise in animal studies, and some are so far along that human clinical trials could probably have begun at any time in the past several years .... Some of these vaccines have been stuck in this position for 10 years. 278 FDA should work closely with sponsors to ensure that promising products are not 'stuck' when opportunity knocks. Fast Track designation offers one existing, but thus far underutilized, means of achieving this.
C. Collaborating with international partners
In September 2014, the International Coalition of Medicines Regulatory Authorities (ICMRA), of which FDA is a member, issued a statement pledging that regulators would 'work together internationally to find innovative solutions to facilitate evaluation of and access to potential new medicines to counter Ebola outbreaks'. 279 ICMRA is a relatively new body 280 that brings together heads of NRAs 'from around the world to enable a shared strategic leadership to address current and emerging global regulatory challenges and to better leverage resources in ways that expand global regulatory reach'. 281 In light of the realization that PHEICs present global regulatory challenges, FDA and others should continue to collaborate in order to identify emerging public health threats that implicate NRAs in a timely fashion, foster synergies and efficiencies between NRAs, reduce duplicative efforts, and, ultimately, regulate within a complex domain in a manner that improves availability of and access to safe and effective medicines. 282 ICMRA has already pledged to support WHO in countering the Zika outbreak by working together and 'building on ICMRA's collaborative work on Ebola'. 283 Longer term, ICMRA has a stated goal of establishing a global architecture to support enhanced communication, information-sharing and crisis response. ICMRA will also focus on strengthening regulatory systems and capacity, and increasing awareness of and appreciation for the importance of strong regulatory systems and functions within national, sub-regional, and global contexts. 284 Such high-level efforts would be beneficial when confronting new and re-emerging public health threats.
During the 2014 EVD outbreak, FDA also worked collaboratively with WHO and its international regulatory counterparts, such as the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and Health Canada, to share information. 285 For instance, FDA entered into a variety of cooperative arrangements. These included international confidentiality commitments (CCs) between FDA and the Ministry of Public Health and Hygiene of Guinea, 286 the Pharmacy Board of Sierra Leone, 287 and the Liberian Medicines and Health Products
Regulatory Authority, 288 as well as WHO. 289 A CC is a document that establishes a legal framework for FDA 'to share certain kinds of non-public information with FDA counterparts in foreign countries and international organizations as part of cooperative law enforcement or regulatory activities'. 290 Such collaborations are intended to support regulatory collaboration, accelerate product development, and contribute to the approval of medical products in the United States and abroad. 291 Bilateral statements of cooperation are already part of the response to Zika. 292 Additionally, FDA participated in WHO-sponsored consultations 'with representatives of the international public health community and medical product sponsors, to discuss leading investigational treatments and vaccines for Ebola and key considerations for deployment in West Africa'. 293 And, building on a long-standing collaboration, FDA has encouraged developers of EVD medicines to submit applications for orphan designation to FDA and to the EMA simultaneously so that the agencies can work collaboratively and speed the development process. 294 Collaborative efforts are and should continue to be an important part of FDA's response to PHEICs. Working with FDA's international colleagues both to build the architecture for broad regulatory collaboration and to execute cooperative arrangements in response to particular threats should harmonize and accelerate drug development and approval at home and abroad.
D. Providing general guidance on trial design
As a result of its unique regulatory role, FDA is positioned to identify drug development issues and gaps in drug development processes, 295 and it has employed various means to address such challenges over the years. 296 FDA has, for example, become increasingly involved in designing clinical trials, which 'reflect[s] the view that the public, the industry, and the FDA are poorly served by drug development efforts that are poorly designed or inadequate and that therefore waste resources and delay availability of therapy'. 297 FDA acknowledged that the EVD 'epidemic has highlighted the importance of being able to rapidly evaluate investigational products during a public health emergency, including in resource limited settings'. 298 In an important piece of advocacy, particularly given the ethical and methodological controversies surrounding trial design described in Section II.D above, officials at FDA made the case for RCTs when evaluating Ebola therapies in the New England Journal of Medicine in December 2014. 299 Agency officials also outlined the FDA perspective on evaluating medical products for EVDseparating out considerations for vaccines and therapeutic products-in an article in Clinical Trials. 300 The officials underscored the need for 'scientifically valid studies that are ethically acceptable and well conducted to provide timely, interpretable data'. 301 Additionally, in November 2015, FDA held a workshop in partnership with NIAID, CDC, and the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response to discuss 'the scientific, ethical, and practical issues considered in the choice of specific trial designs, and the generalizability of these designs for other types of emerging infectious diseases'. 302 FDA is working to develop 'a flexible, innovative and adaptive clinical trial protocol that will provide a mechanism for product sponsors and investigators to evaluate multiple investigational products under a common protocol'. 303 I welcome such efforts and encourage FDA to continue to pursue them beyond the 2014 Ebola outbreak.
'Platform trials'-clinical trials with a master protocol in which multiple treatments are evaluated simultaneously-have been planned and/or implemented in a variety of diseases, including Ebola. 304 Platform trials have the advantage of allowing for standardized data collection and providing for a common statistical analysis plan. 305 As a result, they 'can find beneficial treatments with fewer patients, fewer patient failures, less time, and with greater probability of success than a traditional two-arm strategy'. 306 Moreover, it is easier to show the comparative effectiveness of different experimental interventions in platform trials. 307 Such trials have the additional advantage of having only one control group with numerous experimental arms, which satisfies the need for methodological rigor while also minimizing randomization to control arms, both of which were addressed in Section II, above. A potential drawback to platform trials is that they 'require considerable coordination of efforts that may be difficult to achieve during an outbreak'. 308 Additionally, pharmaceutical companies might not naturally gravitate to such a trial design because the approach is inherently cooperative, while their industry is inherently competitive. It is important that FDA lend its weight to such a plan and serve as a hub, coordinating between sponsors and investigators.
Furthermore, FDA must continue to collaborate with NRAs and WHO to come up with broad-based solutions that are acceptable to all stakeholders. FDA can and should use the interepidemic period to address transparently the practical, scientific, and ethical issues presented by such a trial design-many of which were addressed in Section II-and build consensus behind its choices. I stress that the process of consensus-building will require FDA to examine and synthesize the emerging literature on conducting research in public health emergencies. 309 Understandably, a number of concerns were raised about researchers' ability to adhere to ethical principles while conducting research in the midst of the 2014 Ebola outbreak. 310 The urgent demand for use of experimental interventions coupled with the complex dynamics of the outbreak itself made it difficult to be confident that standard subject protections were in place. Such concerns are particularly potent when the potential population of research participants is vulnerable, and the perceived legitimacy of clinical research may affect the uptake of clinical care. 311 FDA can-and must-continue to play an active role in ensuring adequate protections for research participants in public health emergencies. While it has the power to require adherence to GCPs in domestic and foreign trials used for getting FDA approval, additional constraints on clinical research conducted in public health emergencies should be considered. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on such protections, I will offer some initial comments. First, it may be necessary to more rigorously distinguish research regarding treatment from research pertaining to prevention in outbreak situations. 312 Furthermore, EVD is a public health emergency that can be controlled-and must be addressed-through public health measures. In developed countries, the use of local infrastructure and human resources by research studies generally does not interfere with the provision of healthcare; however, this may not be true in developing countries. For instance, research activities might take up space in a local clinic or require the staff's time and attention, thereby reducing the availability of clinical care. This can be of particular concern in a public health emergency in developing countries, where a disease outbreak places additional burdens on the already strained local healthcare infrastructure. 313 Research should be allowed only when it will not make research subjects or the host community prospectively worse off. 314 If clinical research takes place, it must be conducted in parallel with the components of outbreak control. 315 Additionally, FDA must confront the ethical challenges that surround the inclusion of special populations in clinical research conducted during public health emergencies. For example, pregnant women-and by extension their fetuses-should be enrolled in Zika-related drug and vaccine trials. A pregnant woman can pass Zika virus to her fetus, and CDC has concluded that Zika is a definitive cause of birth defects. 316 Yet, it has rightly been observed that there is no broadly accepted ethical framework for the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical research, and this has had a 'chilling effect' on academic and industry-led research in pregnancy. 317 The inclusion of pregnant women introduces legal and ethical wrinkles into trial design that should be resolved proactively and transparently.
E. Considering alternative approval pathways FDA considered use of alternative drug efficacy testing pathways as it became apparent that conducting RCTs would be infeasible due to the epidemiological trajectory of the 2014 outbreak. 318 Like traditional approval, accelerated approval has 'the same requirements for demonstration of safety and consistency of manufacture'. 322 The Animal Efficacy Rule or 'Animal Rule' was introduced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 323 Though concerns about bioterrorism constituted the original impetus for the rule, the final guidance, issued in October 2015, clarifies that products intended to address threats from emerging infectious pathogens would also be eligible. 324 Use of the animal rule as a regulatory pathway to approval is intended for drugs developed to ameliorate or prevent serious or life-threatening conditions caused by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear substances regardless of whether the substances are considered potential threat agents for deliberate exposure (e.g., nerve agent, Bacillus anthracis) or threats to individuals' health from accidental exposure (e.g., emerging infectious pathogens, snake venom, industrial chemicals), provided that human efficacy studies are not ethical and field trials to study effectiveness of the drug are not feasible. 325 For FDA to apply the animal rule, the agency would first have to determine that approval is not possible through traditional or accelerated approval. 326 Use of the animal rule can be considered on a product-by-product basis. 327 The Animal Rule pathway is best understood as a compromise: the investigational product is tested in humans under existing requirements for establishing the safety of new drugs, while determinations of efficacy are based on 'animal efficacy studies when the results of those studies establish that the drug is reasonably likely to produce clinical benefit in humans'. 328 The Animal Rule was not intended to make FDA approval for novel MCMs easier to obtain. 329 To the contrary, investigators may need to 'develop, test and validate animal models, in addition to determining the efficacy and optimal dose of their countermeasures', and testing in multiple animal species is usually required. 330 rule. 337 At present, drugs and vaccines for EVD remain at the stage of investigational products, which will be inadequate if another Ebola outbreak occurs. 338 The animal rule may represent the best chance to develop MCMs before they are needed, despite the fact that it will not be possible to be certain a drug will actually work when it is needed. Recognizing that sporadic outbreaks, uncertain epidemiological trajectories, small patient populations, and clinical uncertainty may make it difficult to collect data in epidemics, FDA should be transparent about the conditions under which alternative pathways will be considered and what the tradeoffs are between certainty and access.
FDA can further improve its response by actively building scientific consensus around animal models for specific disease threats, if possible; there are no wellcharacterized animal models for many potential threats to public health. 339 Moreover, companies will need FDA to provide guidance for modeling special populations that may be affected by new and re-emerging threats to public health, such as children and the elderly. 340 Various offices within FDA use the animal rule, which could lead to divergent interpretations. Processes should be put into place to ensure consistent interpretation of the animal rule within the agency. 341 Ideally, requirements and expectations for nontraditional approval pathways would be harmonized across NRAs. 342 More drugs might be in the pipeline if the rules were clearer. 343 Nevertheless, use of the animal rule will entail a complex and iterative process. As a result, communication between developers and FDA should be frequent and ongoing.
Finally, approval under either accelerated approval or the animal rule pathway would require that post-licensure studies be conducted in the future to verify and describe clinical benefit. 344 FDA-in conjunction with others-should offer guidance to companies preparing these studies.
345
F. Authorizing compassionate use of drug products 'Compassionate use', or expanded access, 'is the use of investigational new drug products outside of clinical trials to treat patients with serious or immediately lifethreatening diseases or conditions when there are no comparable or satisfactory alternative treatment options'. 346 FDA has mechanisms for allowing expanded access to from FDA. 352 Brantley and Writebol ultimately recovered. 353 While their recoveries were encouraging, it was not possible to reach a sound conclusion about ZMapp's safety or efficacy on the basis of Brantley's and Writebol's experiences alone. 354 At the time, Dr. Bruce Ribner, director of Emory's Infectious Disease Unit acknowledged, 'There is no prior experience with [ZMapp] , and frankly, we do not know whether it helped them, whether it made no difference, or even, theoretically if it delayed their recovery'. 355 Compassionate use provided no clear evidence that experimental interventions like ZMapp were actually superior to supportive care, nor did compassionate use foreclose the possibility that they were inferior. Yet, in the 2014 outbreak, quantitates of experimental interventions were extremely limited. For instance, by August 2014, supplies of ZMapp had been exhausted. 356 Given that it was not possible to conduct a valid RCT with so few doses, compassionate use was not necessarily inappropriate, though it still raised questions about fairness in the allocation of a scarce resource, an issue addressed above. 357 The decision to allow compassionate use during the 2014 EVD outbreak was further complicated by the reality confronted by researchers on the ground: 'the same volatile mix of skepticism, fear, false rumor, and understandable mistrust that helped spread Ebola in the first place'. 358 Many argued that West African communities would require some degree of demonstrated efficacy in humans to alleviate their 'significant suspicion of outbreak response teams, including researchers'. 359 Moreover, as 'there hadn't been human trials, no one wanted to appear to be experimenting on an African'. 360 It was decided, for example, not to give Dr. Sheik Humarr Khan, a Sierra Leonean physician who beginning with a wholly new compound because these drugs "have already been subjected to pre-clinical ... testing and are already deemed to be pharmacologically active, effective and safe in some clinical context". 367 Moreover, results from the clinical trials sometimes indicate that the drug may have effects on similar conditions or viruses transmitted via similar mechanisms. Repurposing speeds development, which hopefully translates to approval and availability sooner than would otherwise be possible. It is thus a means of filling in gaps in our drug arsenal that is beneficial to pharmaceutical companies and consumers alike. How might FDA promote this practice for public health threats?
In 2010, FDA 'launched an orphan drug disease development database to encourage manufacturers to develop drugs for rare diseases by identifying products that have already received FDA approval and that have potential to treat rare diseases through added indications'. 368 This database, the Rare Disease Repurposing Database (RDRD), is still in its Beta version. 369 In future iterations, it should be expanded to include products that have potential to treat NTDs and other public health threats, which may not be rare diseases as statutorily defined in the Orphan Drug Act but which need to be addressed nonetheless. Such a database may help with the identification and development of promising compounds during interemergency periods, and as has been repeatedly stressed above, would allow for the advanced planning that is needed if clinical research can only be practicably and/or ethically conducted during an outbreak. FDA could also urge companies to move forward with particularly promising compounds, as it has said it will do for rare diseases. 370 Some have criticized the RDRD because it failed to address the need to incentivize manufacturers to incur the cost of repurposing. 371 Yet, such a database would be complemented by other 'push' and 'pull' incentives, such as orphan drug designation, PRVs, and fast-track approval.
Off-label use
FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and doctors can prescribe FDAapproved drugs for treatment regimens or patient populations that are not listed in the FDA-approved labeling. 372 It is, therefore, unsurprising that FDA did not vigorously address off-label use as part of its response to the 2014 outbreak. In anticipation of future public health emergencies, however, FDA should do more to promote research into off-label uses, and ideally, work to expand product labeling so that safe and effective off-label uses are included in FDA-approved labeling. the problem. The two biggest problems within the purview of FDA to address are drug development-that is, drugs are not being developed and must pass through clinical trials before FDA can approve them-and post-approval access-once drugs are approved, there is no guarantee they will go where they are most needed. These are the areas in which, viewing the response as a whole, there are the greatest deficiencies and the greatest possibilities for improvement.
Meeting these goals is not the sole responsibility of FDA, and, in fact, I have suggested above that FDA is not always the actor best positioned to address these problems. The primary locus of the federal government's mission to develop drugs is, for instance, elsewhere: particularly at NIH and BARDA. Nevertheless, it is possible for FDA to work both alone and in concert with others to further each of these ends. Given FDA's stature nationally and internationally, the agency has the potential to be a powerful advocate for change, and congressional action could further strengthen its position.
CONCLUSION
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa constituted a public health emergency of international concern. FDA was one of the crucial players in the aftermath of the outbreak because there was a need for and emphasis on developing experimental therapies to supplement the current standard of care. As this paper has emphasized, FDA employed a wide swath of the regulatory mechanisms available to it to protect and promote the public health. This entailed collaboration with the medical and scientific community, industry, international organizations, and other regulators. Considering that FDA in meaningful ways started from behind as the Ebola outbreak unfolded, the end result was a generally effective response. Even now, however, there are no FDA-approved vaccines or drugs for prevention or treatment of Ebola. Moreover, there are concerns about other emerging and re-emerging diseases. The challenges FDA encountered to drug development, approval, and access in the midst of the 2014 outbreak will be encountered again, repeatedly. Looking forward, FDA will have ongoing opportunities to take a leadership role in public health emergencies nationally and internationally. Lessons drawn from the 2014 outbreak should be used to adapt accordingly.
